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Abstract: 
We study the impact of advice or observation on the depth of reasoning in an experimental 
beauty-contest game. Both sources of information trigger faster convergence to the 
equilibrium. Yet, we find that subjects who receive naïve advice outperform uninformed 
subjects permanently, whereas subjects who observe others’ past behavior before making 
their decision do only have a temporary advantage over uninformed subjects. We show in a 
simulation that the latter result is due to subjects failing to make the most out of observing 
others. 
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1. Introduction 
Before making a decision, many subjects seek advice from others or simply observe 
what others have been doing in the past. For example, many consumers read customer 
reviews before buying a new book in an Internet bookstore, or it is quite common to take a 
curious look into some friends’ garages prior to buying a new car. Likewise, before deciding 
in which assets to invest, people tend to investigate the past performance of the asset or ask 
their friends about their experience. 
A recent strand of the economics literature (initiated by Andy Schotter and several co-
authors) has shown that both sources of information – receiving advice and observing others – 
can have a significant impact on decisions. One important finding of this literature (see, e.g. 
Chaudhuri et al., 2001, 2006; Schotter and Sopher, 2003, 2007; Celen et al., 2006) is that both 
advice and observation need not origin from experts to be effective. Rather, it is sufficient for 
the advice and the observed data to stem from subjects who have made one single experience 
with the decision to be taken. This is why the term naïve advice (Schotter, 2003) has been 
termed to describe the advice from such non-experts. Learning from previous decisions taken 
by unrelated others in the past is typically referred to as observational learning. The term 
social learning captures both sources of information, naïve advice and observational learning. 
In this paper we study the impact of naïve advice and observational learning on the 
depths of reasoning and performance in an experimental beauty-contest game (Nagel, 1995). 
This game has been likened to professional investment activity since Keynes (1936) has 
compared investment decisions on financial markets to the beauty-contests run in newspapers 
at his time (where readers had to decide on which out of several faces they considered to be 
the most popular among the general readership of the newspaper). Obviously, both naïve 
advice and observational learning play an important role for investment decisions, in 
particular for private investors who seek out advice on and observe past performance of 
financial assets. 
Not only that the beauty-contest game has a straightforward application in financial 
markets, it is also ideal for studying an individual’s depths of reasoning and the performance 
of subjects who receive advice or observe others compared to those subjects who do not. 
More generally, the beauty-contest game is an excellent tool for analyzing reasoning 
processes, because (i) it is relatively simple, but still captures all important aspects of an 
interactive game where it is crucial to anticipate what others do; (ii) learning and reasoning 
can be observed and studied easily in this game; (iii) performance can be measured directly 
since in its standard form it is a winner-takes all game; and (iv) social preferences, risk 
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aversion or loss aversion are practically irrelevant, contrary to most other games for which the 
influence of naïve advice and observational learning have been studied so far.1
Although there is an extensive literature on the beauty-contest game (see, e.g., Nagel, 
1995; Duffy and Nagel, 1997; Ho et al., 1998; Bosch-Domenech et al., 2002; Güth et al., 
2002; Camerer et al., 2003; Weber, 2003; Kocher and Sutter, 2005; Sutter, 2005; Kocher et 
al., 2006; Costa-Gomes and Crawford, 2007; Grosskopf and Nagel, 2007), there are only a 
few recent papers that are more closely related to the research questions in this paper. Sbriglia 
(2004) presents a beauty-contest experiment where the winner of each period drops out from 
the game, but has to give an explanation for his choice that is subsequently shown to the 
remaining participants at the beginning of the next period. Such a procedure accelerates the 
learning process and the convergence to the equilibrium considerably, compared to a control 
setting without an explanation of the winner. Hence, advice (in the form of an explanation for 
one’s choice) seems to increase the depths of reasoning. 2
Slonim (2005) examines the influence of experience in a beauty-contest game. He lets 
experienced subjects (who have already played the game before) compete against 
inexperienced ones. He finds that experienced subjects win the game significantly more often 
in each single period. However, the relative advantage of experienced subjects diminishes 
over time. Of course, having experienced the game oneself before is a similar form of 
information as observational learning, yet it is not what one would claim to be equivalent to 
observational learning. 
In our paper we are interested in the effects of observing others’ past behavior 
(observational learning), which clearly distinguishes our paper from Slonim (2005). In 
contrast to Sbriglia (2004) we let subjects who receive advice compete against subjects who 
do not receive advice. Hence, we are able to check whether receiving advice increases one’s 
relative performance, which is not possible in the design of Sbriglia (2004) where all 
                                                 
1 The literature on naïve advice and observational learning has, so far, focused on bargaining and 
coordination games (Chaudhuri et al., 2001, 2006; Schotter and Sopher 2003, 2007). Naïve advice facilitates 
coordination and yields higher cooperation levels in a battle-of-the-sexes game (Schotter and Sopher; 2003), 
minimum games (Chaudhuri et al., 2001) and in public goods games (Chaudhuri et al., 2006). Ultimatum 
bargaining gets tougher with advice and observation, as it yields lower offers and more rejections (Schotter and 
Sopher, 2007). Celen et al. (2006) study the impact of advice and observation on the processing of information in 
an information cascade experiment and find that subjects tend to follow the advice of others, but mostly ignore 
the past behavior of others (even though both types of information are equally informative in their setup). 
2 An example for a paper that is studying the effects of expert advice in a related game, the traveler’s dilemma, is 
Capra et al. (2003). 
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members of a group receive the advice from the previous period’s winner. Finally, in our 
experimental design we can comparatively assess the value of naïve advice and of 
observational learning. 
Our results indicate that both naïve advice and the observation of past behavior 
accelerate convergence to the equilibrium significantly. Thus, both types of information have 
a qualitatively similar effect on convergence. Regarding profits we find that subjects who 
observe others do only have a temporary advantage over uninformed subjects, whereas 
subjects receiving advice outperform uninformed subjects consistently. The latter finding 
indicates a clear advantage of receiving advice over observing others’ past behavior. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the beauty-contest game, and 
Section 3 describes our experimental design. Section 4 is devoted to derive predictions. 
Results are presented in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes the paper by discussing our 
findings. 
 
 
2. The beauty-contest game 
In a beauty-contest game n decision-makers i = 1,…,n simultaneously choose a real 
number . The winner is the participant whose number is closest to a target 
value 
[ 100,0=∈ Xxi ]
x , which is defined as p times the average chosen number, with 0 < p < 1. 
1
n
i
i
x
x p
n
==
∑
 (1) 
The winner receives a given prize r > 0, while all other n-1 players get nothing. This 
game is dominance-solvable by assuming common knowledge of rationality. The process of 
eliminating weakly dominated strategies starts with the observation that any number higher 
than 100 p⋅  is weakly dominated, because 100 p⋅  is the highest possible winning number. 
Given this first step of elimination, it is straightforward to see that the process continues by 
eliminating all numbers above 2100 p⋅ , then all numbers above 3100 p⋅ , and so on. After an 
infinite series of steps of reasoning the number zero remains as the only undominated choice. 
All previous experimental studies show that the unraveling process stops, on average, 
after only a few steps of reasoning. Obviously, this can be due to an insufficient depth of 
reasoning or due to specific beliefs over the other players’ depths of reasoning, or even 
specific beliefs over the beliefs over the distribution of other players’ depths of reasoning, and 
so on. The interactive component of decision making and the difficulty of belief management 
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are the basis for the intuitive expectation that naïve advice and observational learning might 
play an important role for the behavior in beauty-contest games as both sources reveal 
information about other subjects. 
 
 
3. Experimental design 
The beauty-contest game was played in groups of three persons and repeated for four 
periods in all experimental treatments. We set the parameter p = 2/3. The prize of winning the 
game was € 7 in each period. In case of a tie the prize was shared equally among those who 
tied. All participants received a show-up fee of € 3. After each period subjects were informed 
about the three numbers chosen in their group, the average number and the target value x . 
Three treatments of this basic game were implemented. 
1. Control-treatment. In this treatment subjects played the beauty-contest game as 
described above. At the end of the experiment, participants in Control were asked to fill in an 
advice sheet that should contain the following three items: (i) a suggested number for period 
1, (ii) a brief statement why this number should be chosen, and (iii) a descriptive strategy how 
to choose one’s numbers in periods 2 to 4. These advice sheets were used in subsequent 
sessions with advice. Note that participants in Control were not informed about our request to 
fill in an advice sheet before the end of period 4 in order to avoid any confounding influence 
on their decisions. To incentivize advice-giving, participants in Control were told that four 
randomly selected advice sheets would be distributed to participants in later sessions such that 
only one out of three group members in these later sessions would receive advice. If a 
particular subject’s advice sheet were to be distributed in a later session, this subject would 
earn three times the amount of one randomly drawn participant who had access to the 
particular advice sheet. Profits for advice for the randomly selected four participants in 
Control were paid after the advice sessions had been carried out.3 Since advisors benefit from 
giving valuable advice with positive probability, the procedure is incentive compatible. 
Furthermore, we did everything to ensure credibility of the procedure, and given the elaborate 
advice statements, we are sure that the incentive mechanism worked well. Note finally that 
                                                 
3 Subjects were asked to provide their e-mail addresses, and the four randomly selected advice-givers received a 
notification e-mail with information about the additional amount they had earned through their advice. The 
money was transferred on their bank account which they had to provide at that stage only. Thus, transaction 
costs in connection with their claim were very small for the winners compared to the quite substantial additional 
earnings, which ranged from € 42 to € 84. 
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advice-giving was anonymous, which means that the advisee did not get any information 
about his or her specific advisor and vice versa.4
2. OneHist-treatment. Conditions in OneHist were identical to Control except that one 
randomly determined group member received the information shown in Table 1. Henceforth, 
we will refer to the information in Table 1 as history. The table contains the average chosen 
number and the average target value in each period of Control.5 Participants in OneHist knew 
that only one member per group was equipped with information about the average choices of 
the 33 participants in the Control-treatment. When giving feedback on the chosen numbers 
within a group after each period, we did not reveal which of the submitted numbers had come 
from the member with history information. 
 
Table 1 
History of Control 
 Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 
Overall averages (N = 33) 32.9 22.9 20.5 12.3 
Average target value 21.9 15.3 13.6 8.2 
 
3. OneAdv-treatment. This treatment was identical to Control except that one randomly 
selected group member received four randomly selected advice sheets out of the 33 sheets that 
had been collected from participants in Control.6 The contents of the four selected advice 
sheets are displayed in Table 2 and will be referred to as advice in the following. To make the 
procedure as credible as possible we distributed the Xerox-copied hand-written sheets instead 
of providing the advice statements in any other form (e.g. electronically on the screen). We 
used the same four sheets of advice in each group in order to keep OneAdv and OneHist as 
comparable as possible for a comparative assessment of the impact of naïve advice and the 
observation of history. For the same reason we decided to use four sheets of advice – instead 
of any other number – because subjects in OneHist received information on four periods; this 
is as close as we believe one can get. Like in OneHist subjects in OneAdv were informed that 
                                                 
4 Details can be found in the experimental instructions that are provided in Appendix A. 
5 Actually, the median would be more informative than the average if there were a substantial number of outliers. 
Since that was not the case we decided to provide subjects with the mean (which is typically also more quickly 
understood than the median). 
6 In Appendix B we provide all 33 sheets of advice that we collected in Control. We let a student in one of our 
classes draw the four advice sheets out of the 33. 
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only one group member would receive the advice sheets, and this member was not unveiled 
when all group members received feedback on the chosen numbers. 
 
Table 2 
Sheets of advice distributed in OneAdv 
 
Number suggested 
for period 1 Reason Strategy 
Advice 
sheet 1 27 
Since 2/3 of the average of all numbers is 
the target, the target number is not too 
high (between 10 and 20). However, some 
of the participants do not know this, and 
the target in Period 1 is above the targets 
of later periods. 
Decrease the number from period to period. 
The participants realize that they should 
decrease the numbers (actually, the target 
should converge to zero). However, you 
cannot count on the others: set a number 
between 13 and 21. 
Advice 
sheet 2 13.5 
Most of the time the game starts with a 
low number. 
Slowly increase the number from period to 
period. Increase the number by not more 
than 10 in one step. 
Advice 
sheet 3 0 
To see how the other participants behave. 
If the others think that the people in the 
group are “rational”, they should also 
choose zero. 
You can see whether the other participants 
know what the game is about or whether 
they just guess. If they guess, you should set 
around the target number of the previous 
period. If they do not guess, set zero again. 
Advice 
sheet 4 30 
Since there are three participants, the 
average number out of 0 – 100 is 33. 
Hence, people like to choose this number. 
However, the average will be multiplied 
by 2/3, which will reduce the target value. 
This means that a number below 33 might 
be closest to the target value. 
There is tendency to decrease numbers, 
which results from the multiplication of the 
average by 2/3. Hence, lower numbers 
should come closer to the final value. 
 
 
All experimental sessions were run at the University of Innsbruck (using zTree, 
Fischbacher, 2007). A total of 96 students in their first and second year participated. None of 
them had ever attended a game theory class or participated in a beauty-contest experiment 
before. Sessions lasted approximately 30 minutes, and subjects earned € 12.33 on average 
(including the show-up fee of € 3). 
 
 
4. Predictions 
The possible access to advice or history obviously does not change the equilibrium 
prediction of the game when assuming common knowledge of rationality. However, the 
behavior observed in beauty-contests does not support standard predictions. In order to derive 
alternative predictions, it, thus, makes sense to rely on empirical models that assume (at least 
partly) bounded rationality. Relaxing the assumptions of full rationality and common 
knowledge of it may then yield advice or history a valuable source for a decision maker 
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because they convey information about the average depths of reasoning and beliefs in the 
population. 
One prominent model to explain behavior in the beauty-contest game has been proposed 
by Camerer et al. (2004) and is known as the cognitive hierarchy model (CHM). In general, 
this model is based on the assumption of step-level reasoning, meaning that subjects may 
differ in the number of steps of iterated thinking (i.e. iterated elimination of weakly 
dominated strategies). A step-zero player is assumed to randomize from the available strategy 
space. A step-one player plays best response to step-zero players, but disregards the existence 
of players with higher steps of reasoning. More generally, a step-d player responds optimally 
to lower-step players. Hence, the cognitive hierarchy model retains the best-response 
characteristic of standard game-theoretic equilibria (with the exception of zero-step players), 
but weakens equilibrium properties such as belief and choice consistency. 
More specifically, the CHM assumes that the frequency of players applying a different 
level of steps of reasoning is distributed according to a Poisson distribution with mean and 
variance τ. Thus, d steps of reasoning are assumed to occur with probability 
. Using several data sets from experimental beauty-contest games, Camerer 
et al. (2004) estimate the parameter τ to be typically in the range [1, 2].
!/)( dedf dττ−=
7
For the sake of succinctness we are not going into the details of the CHM here. Rather, 
we will assume for our analysis in the results section that subjects behave according to the 
model.8 In the following, we would like to concentrate on deriving predictions for the 
behavior of subjects who receive either advice or history. Since the CHM is a static model 
(that does not imply predictions for behavior in later periods), we will only consider behavior 
in the first period.9
                                                 
7 Gneezy (2005) shows that bidding behavior in auctions can also be captured by the CHM and that the estimated 
τ for auctions is close to the one for beauty-contest games (see also Kovac et al., 2004, on the latter). 
8 Two assumptions are noteworthy. First, step-d players are assumed (a) to neglect that there are other players 
who are actually doing more than d steps of reasoning and (b) to fail realizing that there are other players with 
step-d reasoning. Second, step-d players are assumed to predict the relative proportion of players with less than d 
steps of reasoning accurately. The interested reader is referred to Camerer et al. (2004) for details. 
9 Deriving predictions for periods 2 to 4 on the basis of the cognitive hierarchy model is beyond the scope of this 
paper. Such an endeavour would require several non-trivial modelling decisions on the learning dynamics of 
different types of players, for instance (i) which fraction of step-zero players becomes step-d players (with d > 
0), (ii) how the depth of reasoning evolves for step-d players at different initial steps of reasoning, and (iii) 
whether and to what extent beliefs about others’ choices are affected from the data in previous periods. 
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Let us start with treatment OneHist. Our analysis rests upon the assumption that the 
population distributions of choices in Control and OneHist are the same. Since subjects were 
invited from a large subject pool (of over 3000 students) and since assignment to treatments 
was random, this assumption is rather innocuous. 
Let x%  be the number chosen by the subject who knows the history (from the Control-
treatment) and let 1x  and 2x  be the numbers of the two other group members in OneHist. 
Recall that p denotes the factor that multiplies the group average and n the number of group 
members. The group member with history will win if his number is closest (or equally close) 
to the target value, i.e. if the following two conditions are satisfied: 
1 2 1 1 2( ) ( )
p px x x x x x x x
n n
− ⋅ + + ≤ − ⋅ + +% % %  and 1 2 2 1 2( ) ( )p px x x x x x x xn n− ⋅ + + ≤ − ⋅ + +% % %   (2) 
Since it is the absolute difference to the target value that determines winning or not, we 
have to perform a case-wise analysis that considers all possible combinations of positive or 
negative deviations from the target value. The details of this analysis are relegated to 
Appendix C, and we present only the main result here. For unimodal distributions of the 
depths of reasoning (like for instance the Poisson or the normal distribution) it can be shown 
that choosing *~hx  maximizes the probability of winning, where 
1* ( 1)h
px n
n p
h= ⋅ − ⋅−% . (3) 
The variable h1 in equation (3) denotes the average number shown in the history for 
period 1 (see Table 1), which is used as the best estimator for the numbers chosen by the other 
two group members, i.e. for 
1
1
/( 1)
n
i
i
x n
−
=
−∑ .10 The optimal choice *~hx  then results from taking 
into account one’s own number x% , i.e. the optimal choice is 
1
1
* ( )
n
h i
i
/x x p x x n
−
=
= = +∑% % % . 
For the OneAdv-treatment it is possible to reach very similar conclusions. One very 
intuitive way to deal with the information in advice is to choose the average number of the 
numbers suggested in the four advice sheets, , as an estimator for 4/
4
1
∑
=
=
a
axa
1
1
n
i
i
p x
n p
−
=
⋅− ∑ . 
Note that the values for a and 1( 1)
p n
n p
−− h
                                                
 are very close to each other in our experiment 
(17.63 versus 18.79), meaning that history and advice convey very similar suggestions for 
 
10 To keep the notation simple we suppress the period subscript in cases where it is not necessary. 
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which numbers to choose. Therefore, there is no reason a priori to expect any of both sources 
to be more valuable than the other. 
 
 
5. Results 
Table 3 reports the medians, means and standard deviations of chosen numbers in the 
three treatments. Notice in all treatments the typical pattern of chosen numbers to decline over 
periods (p < 0.01 for any two consecutive periods and for any treatment11; two-sided 
Wilcoxon signed ranks tests). In the first two periods, the chosen numbers do not differ across 
treatments. However, in periods 3 and 4 the numbers are significantly higher in Control than 
in the other two treatments (p < 0.05; two-sided Mann-Whitney U-test). Hence, it seems that 
providing information (in the form of advice or history) triggers significantly faster 
convergence to the equilibrium in the later periods of the experiment. 
 
Table 3 
Median and mean numbers 
 Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 
Treatment median mean* median mean median mean median mean 
Control (N = 11) 33.6 32.92 (24.06) 18.5 
22.91 
(17.50) 14.6 
20.48 
(18.46) 10 
12.32 
(8.53) 
OneHist (N = 11) 25.2 33.56 (20.08) 18.5 
23.42 
(15.75) 10.2 
13.43 
(11.2) 6.8 
8.92 
(9.57) 
OneAdv (N = 10) 24.4 29.44 (20.82) 17.5 
20.55 
(15.40) 8.8 
16.6 
(20.63) 5.0 
10.16 
(14.22) 
* Standard deviations are in parentheses. N is the number of groups (with 3 members), i.e. independent observations. 
 
In Table 4 we compare the median and mean choices of the informed as well as the 
uninformed group members. In OneHist we find that the informed members (those who see 
the history) choose significantly lower numbers in periods 1 and 2 (p < 0.05; two-sided 
Wilcoxon signed ranks test12), yet there is no significant difference in periods 3 and 4. In 
OneAdv the informed members (who receive advice) submit significantly smaller numbers in 
every single period (p < 0.05; two-sided Wilcoxon signed ranks test). 
                                                 
11 Obviously, the letter p denotes p-values in the context of test results. Note that we have used the same letter to 
denote the factor that multiplies the average of chosen numbers in the game, because it is often also referred to as 
p-beauty-contest game (see, e.g., Ho et al., 1998). 
12 For this test we match numbers of the informed member with the average numbers of the uninformed members 
within a group. 
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 Table 4 
Median and mean numbers of informed and uninformed subjects 
 Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 
  median mean* median mean median mean median mean 
uninformed 33.3 39.01 (21.41) 22.1 
26.12 
(18.33) 9.2 
11.46 
(12.87) 4.7 
8.85 
(9.53) 
OneHist 
History 
(informed) 21.0 
22.64 
(11.44) 17.0 
18.01 
(6.33) 14.0 
11.37 
(6.79) 7.0 
9.07 
(10.02) 
uninformed 34.7 35.17 (28.04) 22.3 
23.47 
(17.08) 8.8 
19.99 
(24.20) 5.5 
11.94 
(16.43) 
OneAdv 
Naïve advice 
(informed) 20.5 
18 
(7.58) 12.0 
14.7 
(9.77) 8.0 
9.8 
(7.65) 4.0 
6.62 
(7.77) 
* Standard deviations are in parentheses 
 
The findings in Table 4 are supported by an estimation of the depths of reasoning of 
informed and uninformed subjects in OneHist and OneAdv. Applying the cognitive hierarchy 
model of Camerer et al. (2004) yields the estimated values of τ in Table 5. We see for the 
Control-treatment that the estimated depth of reasoning is slightly above one and, thus, in the 
typical range. In treatments OneHist and OneAdv the depths of reasoning of informed group 
members is substantially higher than those of uninformed members.13
 
Table 5 
Estimated depths of reasoning in period 1 
 estimated τ 
Control  1.07 
uninformed 0.96 
OneHist 
History 
(informed) 2.36 
uninformed 0.65 
OneAdv 
Naïve advice 
(informed) 3.13 
 
One noteworthy feature of the data in Table 4 is the finding that the numbers chosen in 
the first period by uninformed members are not significantly different from those chosen in 
                                                 
13 In order to estimate the depths of reasoning of several subsamples of players we search for the parameter τ that 
minimizes xx −τ , where τx  is the predicted average choice for some τ and x  is the actual average choice in 
the subsample. 
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Control. This holds true for both OneHist and OneAdv (compare the entries in the rows 
“uninformed” of OneHist and OneAdv in Table 4 with the entry in row “Control” of Table 3). 
From that one can conclude that, on average, uninformed group members do not take into 
account the fact that another group member is provided with either advice or history. An 
immediate implication of this finding is that using the information contained in advice or 
history should increase the likelihood of winning the beauty-contest game. We now turn to a 
more detailed analysis of this issue. 
 
5.1 The impact of history on performance in OneHist 
The left-hand panel of Figure 1 shows the median numbers chosen by group members 
with access to history and those without. The empty circles indicate the target value contained 
in history (see Table 1). The right-hand panel of Figure 1 displays the average profits of 
informed and uninformed group members. 
 
Figure 1 
Median numbers and profits in OneHist 
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Note from the chosen numbers that the median number of group members with access to 
history is very close to the suggested target in each period. This means that about 50% of the 
informed subjects choose higher numbers than those suggested by the history table. However, 
no subject with history information ever simply imitated the target value shown in Table 1. 
Furthermore, on average informed subjects do not take into account the influence of their own 
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number on the group’s target number. Recall from the previous section that subjects with 
access to history should choose * ( 1) /( )hx p n h n p= ⋅ − ⋅ −%  in the first period, which would be 
18.79. Yet, the median is 21.0 in the first period. While in periods 1 and 2 the median 
numbers of subjects with history information are nevertheless significantly smaller than those 
of uninformed subjects, the latter choose smaller numbers in periods 3 and 4, meaning that 
subjects with information neglect the dynamics of chosen number in their choices and instead 
focus on the information contained in history. 
Subjects with history information win the game significantly more often in period 1 and, 
thus, earn more money than uninformed subjects (p = 0.03; two-sided Wilcoxon signed ranks 
test), but there is no significant difference in later periods (p > 0.6 in periods 2-4), and the 
overall earnings of informed (€ 11.76) and uninformed (€ 8.16) group members are not 
significantly different either (p > 0.4). 
 
5.2 The impact of advice on performance 
Figure 2 shows in the left-hand panel that group members receiving advice choose on 
average lower numbers than uninformed group members in each period. Recall from the 
previous section that we expected subjects with advice to choose *ax a=% = 17.63 in the first 
period. In fact, we observe a slightly higher average number. However, in terms of profits, 
group members with naïve advice clearly outperform the other two members in each single 
period (with p < 0.05 in periods 1, 2, and 4; two-sided Wilcoxon signed ranks test). Overall 
earnings are also significantly higher for informed (€ 17.03) than for uninformed (€ 5.48) 
subjects (p < 0.01). 
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Figure 2 
Median numbers and profits in OneAdv 
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5.3 The comparative effects of advice and history 
Comparing the impact of advice and history we have found that both types of 
information lead in the aggregate to significantly lower numbers in periods 3 and 4, compared 
to the Control-treatment, and thus to quicker convergence to the equilibrium. Concerning the 
performance of those subjects endowed with either advice or history we have found that 
access to advice yields much higher payoffs than access to history (17.03€ in OneAdv vs. 
11.67€ in OneHist). Yet, the difference in earnings is not significant on conventional levels (p 
= 0.16; two-sided Mann Whitney U-test). 
Contrary to the actual payoffs for subjects with either advice or history, we had expected 
history to have a stronger relative influence on the winning probability for the following 
reasons: The information in history is easier to interpret and it is based on a larger sample, and 
this is known to subjects receiving history. Furthermore, some pieces of advice contained 
explicitly wrong statements, such as advice 3 suggesting that “Since there are three 
participants, the average number out of 0-100 is 33”, or advice 2 proposing to increase rather 
than decrease the chosen numbers over time. While statements in advice simply suggest that 
there is a “tendency to decrease numbers” or that “you should decrease the number from 
period to period”, the information in history carries precise data by how much average 
numbers and target values decrease over time. 
Given that the information in history provided a single number for each period, whereas 
advice contained four different suggestions, we would also have expected a smaller variance 
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of the numbers chosen in OneHist than in OneAdv. Yet, the variances (see Table 4) are not 
significantly different (Levene test, p > 0.3), but on average even smaller in OneAdv than in 
OneHist. In sum, it seems that access to advice is more useful than the information contained 
in history. The following subsection examines why this might be the case. 
 
5.4 Some ex-post simulations on how history could have been used better 
Given the rather poor performance of group members with access to history we were 
interested in whether some straightforward strategies for the use of the information contained 
in history could have yielded higher profits for the members with history. We will consider 
three different strategies: (i) pure imitation of the target values contained in history, (ii) best 
reply to the target values in history, and (iii) dynamic best reply to the target values. 
Of course, doing simulations on the strategies of the informed group members requires 
some assumptions regarding the choices of the uninformed group members. The first period 
choices of uninformed members can be taken as they are because they are completely 
independent. Yet, for periods 2 to 4 we have to assume how uninformed subjects would have 
reacted to the different (i.e. simulated) numbers of the informed members. We have decided 
to adjust the actual choice of the two group members without access to history by an 
adjustment factor 
nx
x
f
i ti
ti
t
/3
1 1,
,
∑ = −=  (their choice divided by the group average of the previous 
period) in order to determine their simulated choice in the current period, , by 
 (where )These adjustment factors are calculated from OneHist and 
applied to the simulations. 
sim
tix ,
sim
tt
sim
ti xfx 1, −= 1,1, isimi xx =
Simulation 1 uses the simplest of all possible strategies: imitation of the target value 
stated in history. Hence, we assume that the informed members choose the following number 
in each period t: ,i t tx p h= ⋅ . Figure 3 shows the hypothetical profits for this simulation. Using 
this simple strategy, subjects with history would have earned significantly more than the 
uninformed subjects in periods 1 and 4 as well as over the whole experiment (p < 0.05 in all 
cases; two-sided Wilcoxon signed ranks tests). Recall that in the real sessions (see Figure 1) 
subjects with history did not earn more than uninformed subjects over the entire experiment 
(nor in period 4). Hence, simple imitation would have yielded higher earnings than subjects 
actually achieved. 
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Figure 3 
Simulation 1: Hypothetical average profits for Imitation 
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Simulation 2 assumes that informed subjects use a best-reply strategy that responds 
optimally to the target value shown in history. Hence, informed subjects would choose 
, ( 1) /(i t t )x p n h n p= ⋅ − ⋅ −  in each period. Figure 4 indicates that such a best-reply strategy 
would have resulted in even higher profits than in case of simple imitation. Subjects with 
history information would have earned significantly more money than uninformed subjects in 
periods 1, 2 and 4 as well as overall (p < 0.01 for period 1 and overall, p < 0.1 for periods 2 
and 4; two-sided Wilcoxon signed ranks tests). 
 
Figure 4 
Simulation 2: Hypothetical average profits for Best-reply 
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Simulation 3 assumes a dynamic best-reply strategy of informed subjects where they do 
not only take into account the information in history, but also the dynamics of chosen 
numbers in their own group. Hence, in period 1 we let subjects with history choose the target 
value for period 1. In later periods, informed subjects are assumed to calculate the 
convergence – or adjustment-rate – from period t to period t+1 from history and apply it to the 
target number of the own group in period t in order to determine the number for period t+1. 
Thus, the simulated numbers of informed subjects are as follows (where 1−tx  refers to the 
average number observed in the informed subject’s group in period t–1. 
,
1
1
  
for 1
 for 1
t
i t t
t
t
ph
t
x hx t
h− −
⎧ =⎪= ⎨ ⋅ >⎪⎩
 (4) 
Figure 5 shows the hypothetical earnings for a dynamic best-reply strategy. Informed 
subjects would have earned significantly more money than uninformed subjects in periods 1, 
2 and 4 as well as overall (p < 0.01 for period 1 and overall, p < 0.1 for periods 2 and 4; two-
sided Wilcoxon signed ranks tests). 
 
Figure 5 
Simulation 3: Hypothetical average profits for Best-reply adjustment 
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Comparing hypothetical profits in the three simulations with actual ones in OneHist (see 
Figure 1) we find that the overall hypothetical profits are significantly higher in each of the 
three simulations than the actual profits (p < 0.07 for simulations 1, 2 and 3; two-sided 
Wilcoxon signed ranks tests). This clearly indicates that subjects with access to history are not 
able to make the most out of it. Even rather straightforward strategies like imitation or best-
reply would have performed better than the actual play of informed subjects in the 
experiment. Of course, this statement depends on our assumption about the behavior of 
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uninformed subjects in periods 2-4. Therefore, it is probably noteworthy that the average 
hypothetical profits of informed subjects were about 20% higher than the actual ones already 
in period 1, for which we plugged in the actual choices of uninformed subjects. 
At the end of this subsection we would like to provide some further evidence on the 
possible use of the suggestions in advice. Since each sheet of advice contained a proposed 
number for period 1, we can check whether following any of them separately would have paid 
off. Figure 6 shows the actual average profits of informed subjects as well as the hypothetical 
profits if informed subjects had picked any of the four numbers stated in advice. Note that 
advice 2 suggests choosing the equilibrium, i.e. zero. Yet, this would have yielded the lowest 
average earnings for informed subjects. Note also that the actual average earnings of informed 
subjects are higher than if they had chosen any particular number. This seems to indicate that 
subjects receiving advice do not focus on a single number, but rather try to form a synthesis of 
several pieces of advice, and this also contributes to the relatively better performance of 
subjects with advice than those with history. 
 
Figure 6 
Hypothetical average profits if subjects 
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6. Conclusions 
In this paper we have studied the effects of social learning on the depths of reasoning in 
an experimental beauty-contest game. In particular we have examined how the access to 
adv1: 
choose 27 choose 0 choose13.5
adv4: 
choose 30
uninformed advice
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historical data and how receiving advice from others influence decision making in this game. 
A particular feature of our experiment is that we have set up groups in which only one 
member got access to either advice or history. This approach with asymmetric access to 
advice or history and the use of the beauty-contest game distinguish our paper from previous 
papers on social learning (Chaudhuri et al., 2001, 2005; Schotter and Sopher, 2003, 2007; 
Celen et al., 2006). As a consequence of our setup, we have been able to compare the 
performance of informed versus uninformed subjects, but also of subjects receiving advice 
versus subjects with access to history information. 
Receiving advice and observing historical data has been shown to have a large and 
significant impact on the probability of winning in the very first period. As such, both sources 
of information seem to be a substitute for own previous experience of the game. Camerer and 
Ho (2002) and Slonim (2005), for instance, have shown that experienced subjects (who have 
played a beauty-contest before) approach the equilibrium much faster and outperform 
inexperienced subjects. Similarly, the effects of advice and history are related to the evidence 
on group decision making in the beauty-contest game. (Inexperienced) Groups win the 
beauty-contest game significantly more often than (inexperienced) individuals (Kocher et al., 
2006) due to the experience they can gain in the group discussion. Given these similarities in 
findings, our paper can establish a link between several lines of research that have not been 
closely related so far. 
Another interesting finding of our paper is the asymmetry of advice and history as 
regards their longer-run impact on winning probabilities. Whereas subjects with access to 
advice are able to earn significantly more money over the entire experiment in comparison to 
their uninformed group members, subjects who know the history of previous unrelated 
sessions are not able to earn significantly more than their uninformed counterparts within the 
group. 
In a particular sense this finding is reminiscent of previous studies, which have 
established that advice has a stronger influence on decisions than mere observation (see, for 
example, Schotter and Sopher, 2003, 2007 or Celen et al., 2006). However, in these previous 
studies – as already mentioned before – all subjects in a group had access to the additional 
information, whereas in our case we let informed subjects directly compete against 
uninformed ones. In accordance with the literature, we may conclude that words (i.e. advice) 
have a stronger impact on behavior and the probability of winning a beauty-contest game than 
actions (i.e. history). It seems that subjects who receive advice think more carefully about the 
decision making task than subjects with access to history. The divergent opinions expressed in 
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the four sheets of advice may actually support higher depths of reasoning as they force a 
subject to digest the different suggestions and build an own opinion. This is not to say that 
subjects with access to history do not think about the problem themselves. Recall that no 
subject with history information ever simply imitated the target value shown in Table 1. Our 
simulations at the end of the results section show, however, that subjects with history 
information could have earned more money by doing so (and even more money by using a 
best-reply strategy). 
Of course, one has to be extremely careful with direct applications of our results from a 
stylized experiment to real-world phenomena. Nevertheless, we believe our experiment 
provides a few new and interesting arguments why people in reality often seem to prefer non-
expert advice over history statistics. They probably prefer the brain-teaser of different 
opinions to derive an own strategy instead of history information, and our experiment shows 
that they may be right in doing so. 
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Appendix A: Instructions (translated from German) – for 
referees’ convenience, not necessarily for publication 
[The following instructions have been read aloud prior to the sessions. In all sessions, 
we used the same description of the beauty-contest game. However, parts of the instructions 
are specific to particular treatments. This will be indicated by italic letters.] 
 
Welcome and thank you for participating! Please do not talk to other participants from now 
on. This experiment is about economic decision-making. You will earn “real” money, which 
will be paid out right after the experiment, including a show-up fee of € 3. 
 
Groups and number of periods 
In this experiment we will randomly form groups of three persons. The composition of 
groups will remain fixed and group members will interact for four periods. Your decisions 
will remain anonymous, i.e. you will not learn the identity of the other group members nor 
will they learn your identity. 
 
The decision 
You are a member of a group of three persons. At the beginning of each period, each 
person chooses a number xi out of the range from 0 to 100, including 0 and 100. The number 
does not necessarily have to be an integer, but may not have more than two digits after the 
comma. 
Your payoff depends on the absolute difference between your number and a target 
value. The group member whose number is closest to the target value of a given period 
receives € 7, the others receive zero in the respective period. If the numbers of two or three 
group members are equally close to the target value, then those participants share the price of 
€ 7 equally and receive € 3.5, respectively € 2.33. 
 
Calculation of the target value 
To calculate the target value we first compute the average of the three numbers xi in 
your group. Then, the average is multiplied by 2/3. This yields the target value. In 
mathematical notation: 
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where xi refers to the chosen numbers within a group in a given period. Thus, to win the game 
in a given period you have to come as close as possible to two thirds of the average number in 
your group. 
 
Control-treatment: Advice for participants of future experiments [announced at the end of 
the experiment] 
The experiment explained above will be run several times during the summer term 2005. 
Please give participants of those future experiments an anonymous advice on how to best play 
this game. You find an advice sheet attached to these instructions. Please fill it out. The 
advice has to include 1) a number the player should choose in period 1 and a reason for it as 
well as 2) a strategy you suggest to pursue in the following periods. 
We will randomly pick four advice sheets and distribute these four sheets to participants 
in future experiments. In these experiments one out of three group members will receive the 
four selected sheets. After the experiments will have been run, we will randomly choose four 
players who received the advice sheets. Then, we will match each of those four subjects with 
an advisor (drawn randomly from your experiment) whose advice has been distributed. The 
advisor receives three times the payoff of the person who has been matched with him or her. 
Thus, your payoff from giving advice depends on whether your advice has been 
randomly selected and, if so, it depends on the earnings of the person who has been matched 
with you. The more this person earns (the better your advice was), the more you will earn. 
In order to be able to inform you on your additional earnings from the advice, please 
note your email-address on the form. We will not reveal it to participants of the future 
experiments. 
 
OneHist, Oneadv: Data of previous experiments 
The experiment explained above has been run previously at this university in the 
summer term 2005. A total of 33 persons have participated in these previous sessions (= 11 
groups of three). 
OneHist: We have recorded the data of those games. The data include the average 
chosen number of all 33 participants and the average target value per period. Today, one 
randomly selected group member in each group will receive the data from these previous 
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sessions before the experiment starts. This means that one randomly selected group member 
will get a table which shows the overall average number in each period and the 
corresponding average target value. 
OneAdv: At the end of their experiment, the 33 subjects were asked to fill out an advice 
sheet on how to best play this game. The advice includes a suggested number for period one, 
an explanation for the suggested number, and a suggested strategy to pursue in the following 
periods. We have randomly selected four sheets of advice and have photocopied these sheets. 
The copies will be distributed to one randomly selected group member in each group before 
the experiment starts. Note that the subjects who have written the advice will benefit from 
your earnings. In case you receive some advice sheets and in case one of the four sheets you 
receive is randomly selected at the end of the experiment (with a chance of 1:11), the subject 
who wrote this advice will receive three times your earnings. Note also that this procedure 
does not at all affect your earnings. 
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Appendix B: Advice sheets (translated from German) – for 
referees’ convenience, not for publication 
 
B1: Advice sheets that have been distributed in OneAdv 
Advice 1: 
Choose 27 in Period 1 
Why: Since 2/3 of the average of all numbers is the target, the target number is not too high (between 10 and 
20). However, some of the participants do not know this, and the target in Period 1 is above the targets of later 
periods. 
Strategy: Decrease the number from period to period. The participants realize that they should decrease the 
numbers (actually, the target should converge to zero). However, you cannot count on the others: set a number 
between 13 and 21. 
Advice 2 
Choose 13.5 in Period 1 
Why: Most of the time the game starts with a low number. 
Strategy: Slowly increase the number from period to period. Increase the number by not more than 10 in one 
step. 
Advice 3 
Choose 0 in Period 1 
Why: To see how the other participants behave. If the others think that the people in the group are “rational”, 
they should also choose zero. 
Strategy: You can see whether the other participants know what the game is about or whether they just guess. If 
they guess, you should set around the target number of the previous period. If they do not guess, set zero again. 
Advice 4 
Choose 30 in Period 1 
Why: Since there are three participants, the average number out of 0 – 100 is 33. Hence, people like to choose 
this number. However, the average will be multiplied by 2/3, which will reduce the target value. This means that 
a number below 33 might be closest to the target value. 
Strategy: There is tendency to decrease numbers, which results from the multiplication of the average by 2/3. 
Hence, lower numbers should come closer to the final value. 
 
 
B2: Advice sheets that have not been distributed in OneAdv 
Advice 5 
Choose 25 in Period 1 
Why: Never set above 50. The chance will be higher, because in total there will be some 50 points. Most people 
do not set that high numbers. The first time is the most difficult. 
Strategy: Normally, the number declines, since after the first period, every player sets the target of the previous 
round. The NEW target is thus somewhere around 2/3 of the OLD target. 
Advice 6 
Choose 10 in Period 1 
Why: You are in a group with some other players. Some will choose high, some low numbers or zero. 
Therefore, the probability that you win is highest if you set 10. 
Strategy: If you really win with number 10, then repeat your guess in the next round. If you realize that the 
others adjust and set 10 as well, then choose a lower number (i.e. 7). If you do not win in the first round, then set 
the number of the winner in the second round and in the following rounds a lower number. 
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Advice 7 
Choose 7 in Period 1 
Why: Because at the beginning all choose very low numbers. Never set a number above 75 (mind the formula). 
If one thinks through the formula, the outcome should be low numbers.  
Strategy: Pay attention to whether the others set high or low numbers. If they set low numbers, then choose 
numbers in the low range as well. If they set high numbers, do so as well. 
Advice 8 
Choose 31.5 in Period 1 
Why: Many will go for a number in the center, around 50. The target is 2/3 times the average in the group. Thus, 
one should set a little lower (the best choice is around 30).  
Strategy: Many players will follow the hint from period 1. One can see it from the results of every period. This 
means that one should set a lower number afterwards. 
Advice 9 
Choose 35 in Period 1 
Why: Since the average is multiplied by 2/3 and under the assumption that the opponents choose somewhere 
between 40 and 60, 35 is a dominant strategy. Lower numbers are likely to be too far off the target value, and the 
ones higher are because of the formula not interesting. 
Strategy: It is a dominant strategy to set less points than the opponents. Since they will pursue the same strategy, 
the number must, according to the estimated decline of the opponents, be reduced itself. 
Advice 10 
Choose 15 in Period 1 
Why: The number must be lower than 66.6, since if all players choose 100, the target is only 2/3 times 100. But 
since not all will set 100, it is the best to choose a relatively low number 
Strategy: Always set >2/3 of the target of the last period. (i.e. if the target was 30, then set around 18, because 
the others will lower their xi as well. 
Advice 11 
Choose 33 in Period 1 
Why: I have reached the target value. I have tried to calculate a mean. 
Strategy: Set below the value of your 2 opponents from the last period. Stay in the range of the previously 
chosen values. 
Advice 12 
Choose 15 in Period 1 
Why: This is most likely to correspond to the average numbers of the group 
Strategy: 
Advice 13 
Choose 10 in Period 1 
Why: Low numbers are preferred. Therefore, the target value is below 10 most of the time. 
Strategy: Always set numbers that are a little below those of your opponents. 
Advice 14 
Choose 20 in Period 1 
Why: Generally, it is expected that the participants orientate themselves to the center and choose 50. The target 
is thus 2/3 times 50. If the participants set around 30 to 35, the target is around 20. 
Strategy: General downward tendency, thus decrease your number by around 5 in every round. 
Advice 15 
Choose 8 in Period 1 
Why: In the first round, many do not realize that the number must be lower than the average. If all had fully 
realized it at the beginning, the number would have to approach 0. 
Strategy: normally, the number declines, therefore, I would try numbers between 0 and 2 in the following 
periods. 
 26
Advice 16 
Choose 10 in Period 1 
Why: Probably the others set higher (~ 50) or much lower. Because of the high number the target value 
increases (this participant does not reach it anymore) and you are in between. 
Strategy: Observe what your “partners” set, and stay (if someone sets higher than 50) with your number 
between 10 and 15. If they all decline already in the 2nd period, stay (3rd period) below 10. Good luck. 
Advice 17 
Choose 50 in Period 1 
Why: That is a first approximation. One can see whether the other participants rather set lower ore higher 
numbers. 
Strategy: If the participants have set low numbers (0-49), then also set between 0 and 49. If that is not the case, 
set a number between 50 and 100. 
Advice 18 
Choose 18 in Period 1 
Why: With it you will be in the middle + you check both directions (2 participants who set very low + 2 
participants who set very high numbers. 
Strategy: bare in mind what the participants 1 and 2 choose (if someone chooses very high/low) and adjust. You 
can orientate on the target value of the first period. 
Advice 19 
Choose 16 in Period 1 
Why: It tends to be that at the beginning the participants will set lower numbers. The number should in any case 
never exceed 20, since only 2/3 of the average is the target value. 
Strategy: Follow the tendency of the previous period. (I e. 1 10 50, set the target between one and 10. The other 
players will move into the same direction. Sheering out does not pay. 
Advice 20 
Choose 34.5 in Period 1 
Why: A number between 30 and 40, because of the formula for the target value (average of all 3 numbers times 
2/3), suitable for period 1. This is the case because in my point of view, the other players will choose out of this 
range as well. 
Strategy: Set a number around half of the number you have chosen in period 1. 
Advice 21 
Choose 33 in Period 1 
Why: The players will choose numbers out of the range slightly above the center (50 – 70) because they have to 
reach the value of 2/3. In my case, it worked. 
Strategy: Now the others will move (with some luck) downwards as well. Then, you have to do that as well, but 
if the block moves upwards, go with it. Unfortunately, I did not do so. 
Advice 22 
Choose 13 in Period 1 
Why: Set a number between 10 and 20, in order to find out in what range the sought numbers are. First, start 
with a low number. The probability of a low number is higher (personal opinion) 
Strategy: Right afterwards, try a relatively high number. Then you approximately see how big the numbers are. 
Also, pay attention to the numbers of the other group members. 
Advice 23 
Choose 14 in Period 1 
Why: Assumption, that people start with 20 or slightly lower. 20 times 2/3 is 14. 
Strategy: Downward adjustment of the others. First only little (around 8 to 10) then more (around 2 to 5), 
always according to the average that has been reached by the numbers of the others. 
Advice 24 
Choose 26.55 in Period 1 
Why: You have the choice between 0 and 100. One could assume that one of the three sets around 50 and the 
other one has already realized that and therefore sets only 15-20. Thus it is best to be in the center. 
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Strategy: Observe what the others do. The number tends to decline. The number should always be set lower, 
since the other players will as well always set lower numbers. One orientates herself to the target value. 
Advice 25 
Choose 0 in Period 1 
Why: The higher the number you choose, the lower is the probability to reach the target value. If everyone 
always sets 0, then everyone in the group will win something in every period. 
Strategy: The tendency of numbers goes down, and numbers between 0 and 10 are recommended. The closer to 
zero, the better. Try also decimal digits, not just integer numbers. 
Advice 26 
Choose 26 in Period 1 
Why: If on average everyone sets half of the highest feasible number (50); (50+50+50)/3 = 50; 2/3 times 50 = 
36. Since experience shows that the other players tend to set lower numbers, set 26. 
Strategy: Try to be the player with the lowest bid. In any case, choose a number below 40. 
Advice 27 
Choose 35 in Period 1 
Why: Theoretically, everyone sets 50. Target value ~ 32. If 2 persons set only ~ 30, then you loose, if not, then 
you win. 
Strategy: 18, because now all players try to set 35. You win because of the reaction, see where the experiment 
goes to, you decline to be closer to the theoretical target value, because the others try to cooperate, always 
underbid the target value. 
Advice 28 
Choose 50 in Period 1 
Why: It is safest, lies in the center. You do not know what the other participants choose. 
Strategy: Then 25, then I would take 75. And have always a look which numbers the other participants in your 
group take, and choose them next time. This is more important than 25+75. 
Advice 29 
Choose 0 in Period 1 
Why: If everyone has understood the experiment, everyone will set 0, because then everyone will win something 
(although the prize will be divided by 3). Even if not everyone has understood in the first round, the probability 
that there is a small target value is high, and you have a chance of winning. 
Strategy: Always set 0. If everyone thinks so, everyone earns 4 times 7/3 = 9.30. If not everyone follows the 
system, the target value declines not proportionally (i.e. 20, 10, 4, 0.9). Good luck. 
Advice 30 
Choose 30.1 in Period 1 
Why: 66.6 is the highest feasible number. If you assume that everyone knows that, everyone will choose a small 
number. Therefore 30.1. At least in that range or lower. 
Strategy: Always set lower than the number that has won in the previous period. Last number times 2/3 >= next 
choice. 
Advice 31 
Choose ~20 in Period 1 
Why: If everyone would set 100, then the average would be 66.6. Thus, it is better to set lower than 100. 
Everyone will do so. Therefore, set even lower. You could go on with that infinitely until 0. Since not everyone 
thinks so thoroughly, 20 is a good starting point. 
Strategy: The number will continuously decline. The other participants will learn from the results of the 
previous periods. 
Advice 32 
Choose 25.33 in Period 1 
Why: According to probability, the 3 participants set 150 in total. This number divided by 3 is 50 per 
participant. The target value is 2/3 of it, 33.67. Because you want to approximate it, set 33.67 – 5.67 (your 
difference of 50 – 33.67 – x) – 2.67. 
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Strategy: In what follows all players will decrease their points. You as well! A little more than the others. 
Please: Set your new number below the target value of the previous period. times 2/3 times 0.9. This means: 
Target value Period 3 i.e. 27, then times 2/3 = 18 times 0.9 is 16.2. 
Advice 33 
Choose 10 in Period 1 
Why: a low number increases the chance, because my opponents set only in this range of numbers, at least very 
often (3 out of 4 times). 
Strategy: Orientate yourself to the numbers of the others. In my case there was a tendency to continuously 
decline the numbers. 
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Appendix C: Derivation of predictions for subjects with advice or 
history 
 
 
Here we prove that choosing 1* ( 1h
p )x n
n p
h= ⋅ − ⋅−%  in period 1 is an optimal strategy for 
a subject endowed with history. Moreover, we will argue that by the same logic, it is optimal 
for a subject endowed with advice to choose . 
4
1
* /a a
a
x a x
=
= =∑% 4
As noted above, p is the factor that multiplies the group average, n is the number of 
group members, and h1 is the group average of period 1 included in history. Equation 2 
repeats the two conditions by which the group member endowed with history will win. 
 
1 2 1 1 2( ) ( )h
p px x x x x x x x
n n
− ⋅ + + ≤ − ⋅ + +% % %  and 1 2 2 1 2( ) ( )h p px x x x x x x xn n− ⋅ + + ≤ − ⋅ + +% % % (2) 
 
Since it is the absolute value that determines winning or not, and the differences 
between the individual and target numbers can be either positive or negative, we have to do a 
case-wise analysis. Table 6 has a column for each of the differences included in (2). Since 
three differences can be either positive or negative, we have 2³ = 8 different cases to analyze. 
 
Table 6 
cases (signs of differences) 
case 
1 2( )h
px x x x
n
− ⋅ + +% %  1 1( )p 2x x x xn− ⋅ + +%  2 1( )
p
2x x x xn
− ⋅ + +%  
1 + + + 
2 + - + 
3 + + - 
4 + - - 
5 - + + 
6 - - + 
7 - + - 
8 - - - 
 
Case 8 cannot occur, since it is not possible that all numbers are lower than the target 
value. In case four, either one of the two opponents will win, but never the subject with 
history. We thus restrict our analysis on the remaining cases. For each of those, it is possible 
to readjust the conditions from (2) by simple algebra. 
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Since history is generated from games using the same subject pool than the game that 
the subject endowed with history is playing herself (and this is common knowledge), she can 
reasonably assume that her opponents’ numbers in period 1 are from a distribution with the 
expected value shown in history. Let 1( )f x  and 2( )f x  be the distribution functions of the 
opponents’ numbers, and let  and  be the cumulated distribution functions. The 
following analysis works for a wide variety of such distributions, including all unimodal 
distributions as well as many others. However, for some bimodal distributions the optimal 
behavior is different from the one derived below.
1( )F x 2( )F x
14
 
• Case 1: All differences are positive. 
If all differences between the individual numbers and the target value are positive, the 
group member with additional information will win if 1hx x≤%  and 2hx x≤% . Given the 
distributions from above, the probability of her victory is . Since by 
definition,  is increasing in 
2(1 ( ))hF x− %
( )hF x% hx% , the probability must be decreasing in it. Thus, the 
probability of victory can be maximized by setting the lowest possible number which 
fulfils the criterion that all numbers must be above or equal to the target value. In case 1, 
it is thus best to expect the opponents to set the average of 1( )f x  and 2( )f x  and to give 
an optimal reply by choosing the number such that 
1 2. ( ) ( 1)h
p p
1x E x x n hn p n p
= + = ⋅ −− −% ⋅ . Note that the latter expression is the expected 
target value in period one of the current game, given h1. 
 
• Cases 2 and 3: The number of one opponent is lower than the target value. 
In those cases, the group member endowed with history will win if 
1
2
( 2 )h
p
2x x xn p
⋅≤ ⋅− ⋅% −  (Case 2) or 2
2
( 2 )h
p
1x x xn p
⋅≤ ⋅ −− ⋅%  (Case 3). This results in 
probabilities of victory of 2
21
2 h
n pF x F
p
⎛ ⎞− ⋅− ⋅ −⎜ ⎟⋅⎝ ⎠
% ( )x
                                                
 (Case 2) and 
 
14 For a large number of distributions, the analysis suggests a best reply on the expected sum of opponents’ 
choices to be optimal. However, assume for example that each uninformed member chooses 80 with a 
probability of 10 percent and 0 with a probability of 90 percent. The best reply with respect to the sum of 
expected choices (16) is 4.47. But this number will win only with a probability of 10 percent, while 0 will win 
for sure. 
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1
21
2 h
n pF x F
p
⎛ ⎞− ⋅− ⋅ −⎜ ⎟⋅⎝ ⎠
% ( )x  (Case 3). The probabilities are dependent on either 1x  or 2x . 
Again, since 2
2 h
n pF
p
⎛ − ⋅ ⋅⎜ ⋅⎝ ⎠
%x ⎞⎟  is increasing in x% , it is best to choose the lowest possible 
number, which is the expected target value. 
 
• Case 5: Only the informed subject chooses below the target value. 
Here, the subject with history will win if both 2
2
2h
p
1x x xn p
⋅≥ ⋅− ⋅% −  and 
1
2
2h
p
2x x xn p
⋅≥ ⋅− ⋅% −  hold. The resulting probability of victory is 
2
1,2
2 ( )
2 h
n pF x F x
p
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞− ⋅ ⋅ +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⋅⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
% . It is increasing in x% , meaning that the subject should 
choose the highest possible value that fulfils the constraints of case 5, which again is the 
expected target value. 
 
• Cases 6 and 7: One of the opponents chooses above the target value. 
In the final two cases, the relevant conditions are 2
2
( 2 )h
p
1x x xn p
⋅≥ ⋅− ⋅% −  (Case 6) and 
1
2
( 2 )h
p
2x x xn p
⋅≥ ⋅− ⋅% −  (Case 7). This results in probabilities of victory of 
1
2 ( )
2 h
n pF x F
p
⎛ ⎞− ⋅ ⋅ +⎜ ⎟⋅⎝ ⎠
% x  (Case 6) and 2
2 ( )
2 h
n pF x F
p
⎛ ⎞− ⋅ ⋅ +⎜ ⎟⋅⎝ ⎠
% x  (Case 7). Since 
2
2 h
n pF
p
⎛ − ⋅ ⋅⎜ ⋅⎝ ⎠
%x ⎞⎟  is increasing in hx% , it is best to choose the highest possible number, 
which is the expected target value. 
 
Assuming distributions of non-informed members as described above, we have shown 
that it is optimal in all possible cases to expect the opponents to choose the average number 
given in history and to give a best reply by taking also into account that the own number has 
an influence on the target value. This is applying the formula 
1 2. ( ) ( 1)h
p p
1x E x x n hN p n p
= + = ⋅ −− −% ⋅ , which has been referred to already in case 1. 
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